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This article analyzes why, despite similar transformations in the dimensions structuring
political space since the late 1980s, extreme right-wing populist parties have emerged in
some West European countries, but not in others. Two factors may affect the fortunes
of these parties. First, if electorates remain firmly entrenched in older cleavages, new
parties will find it difficult to establish themselves. Second, the positions of the established
actors with respect to the new cultural divide that the extreme populist right mobilizes
may be crucial. This article systematizes the various explanations regarding the impact
of mainstream party positions on the electoral fortunes of the extreme right, and develops
two new hypotheses that differentiate between the conditions that favor the entry of the
extreme right, and its subsequent success. The various hypotheses are then tested in an
empirical analysis of election campaigns in France and Germany, combining data on
party positions as reflected in the news media with mass-level surveys. The results show
that the diverging behavior of the established parties, rather than the strength of the
traditional state-market cleavage, explains the differences between these two countries.
More specifically, the differing strategy of the mainstream left in the two contexts has
allowed the Front National to anchor itself in the French party system, whereas similar
parties have not achieved a breakthrough in Germany.
Keywords: extreme right parties; cleavages; party system transformation;
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Introduction
The enduring presence of extreme right-wing populist parties in France, Austria,
Switzerland, Flemish Belgium, and Denmark suggests their being firmly rooted in
social structures, and thus that they represent more than outbreaks of popular
disenchantment with representative democracy. What, then, explains the lack of
success of these parties in other countries? Prior research, as well as the results
presented in this article, suggest that voters with anti-universalistic and exclu-
sionist worldviews exist throughoutWestern Europe, and demand-side factors are
thus insufficient to explain the lack of success of the populist right in, for example,
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Germany and Britain (see van der Brug et al., 2005; Kriesi et al., 2008). To explain
differences in the entrenchment of the extreme populist right, I suggest that dif-
fering patterns of party competition account for the emergence and institutiona-
lization of the Front National in France, and for the lack of success of similar
parties in Germany.
I use two hypotheses to explain the differential success of the extreme populist
right in these two cases. First, the capacity of a challenging party to redraw voter
alignments is limited by the degree to which the electorate remains anchored in
older conflicts. In other words, German voters may be more firmly rooted in class
and religious cleavages than their French counterparts. A second explanation lies
in the differing dynamics of competition between established political parties
regarding the cultural issues the extreme populist right thrives upon.
In a first step, I review and systematize the various competing and sometimes
contradictory explanations that have been advanced concerning the effect of
mainstream party competition on the fortunes of right-wing populist challengers.
I argue that the different expectations and even contradictory results of empirical
research on this issue derive from neglecting the difference between strategies
allowing mainstream parties to prevent the entry of the extreme right to the party
system, and those factors that determine the ability of the extreme right to
stabilize support or even grow after an initial breakthrough. In making this dis-
tinction, I build on recent theorizing by Ellinas (2010) and Mudde (2007).
I then argue that the positions of established parties matter primarily for the
entry phase, when the extreme right challenges the mainstream by seeking to
polarize cultural conflicts. To the degree that the mainstream right retains own-
ership of issues such as immigration and the defense of traditionalist values, the
mobilization space for right-wing populist challengers is restricted. Whether or
not the center-right is successful in averting entry by an extreme right competitor,
in turn, also depends on the behavior of the left. Thus, the analysis shows that the
differing positions of the mainstream right and left explain why the Front
National was able to establish itself in the French party system, while parties of
this type have had limited support in Germany. The French case demonstrates that
once such a party has become firmly entrenched in a party system, the position of
the mainstream right may have little effect on its subsequent electoral success.
Finally, this article makes it clear that both the German and French party
systems are responsive to voter preferences along the cultural and economic
divides. More specifically, voters holding anti-universalistic and exclusionist
worldviews exist in both countries, but they are integrated into mainstream party
electorates in Germany, and mobilized by a party of the extreme right in France.
To measure party positions on the economic and cultural dimensions of poli-
tical conflict, I use data from a larger project based on sentence-by-sentence
coding of newspaper coverage of four election campaigns in each country, one in
the 1970s and three since the late 1980s or early 1990s (see Kriesi et al., 2006,
2008). The strength of this data is that it allows me to measure reliably how the
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established parties have dealt with the issues the extreme populist right thrives
upon, as well as with economic issues, both of which impinge on the mobilization
space of the extreme right. Furthermore, in focusing on how the media have
covered party appeals, these data are more situational than other sources based on
party manifestos or expert assessments, and therefore are closer to what voters are
likely to learn about party positions. As the available data do not cover all the
relevant time periods for this study, I complement and validate the media data by
drawing on secondary sources. I also assess the correspondence of party positions
with the preferences of voters by measuring the positions of party electorates
along the same dimensions of political conflict using post-election surveys.
The article is structured as follows. The first section provides the context for the
emergence of the extreme populist right by discussing the transformation of party
systems resulting from a new value opposition that has emerged throughout Western
Europe. I then review the most common explanations for the absence of any impor-
tant party of the extreme populist right at the national level in Germany. The third and
fourth sections theorize, respectively, how older cleavages can be expected to condition
the manifestation of new conflicts, and how the stances of mainstream parties impinge
on the success of the extreme populist right. The analysis thus integrates a cleavage-
theoretical and an actor-centered perspective. The fifth section explains the measure-
ment of the variables in the analysis. The subsequent section tests the hypotheses by
analyzing the transformation of the French and German party systems over three
decades. I conclude by discussing what the results of this analysis imply for extreme
populist right parties in Western Europe beyond the two cases at hand.
The transformation of party systems and the potential of the extreme populist
right in Western Europe
Although many parties present in West European party systems are reminiscent of
the historical class and religious cleavages, the dimensions underlying party
interactions have changed. While the state-market cleavage remains one of the
two dimensions structuring party interactions (e.g. Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008), the
religious cleavage has been transformed into a new cultural dimension of conflict.
A first restructuring of the political space occurred as a consequence of the
mobilization of the New Social Movements of the left in the 1970s and 1980s
(Kitschelt, 1994). Spurred by the educational revolution of the 1960s and 1970s,
the diffusion of universalistic values led actors to call for individual autonomy and
free choice over lifestyles (see Stubager, 2008, 2009). A conservative counter-
movement to the libertarian left gained momentum only in the 1980s and 1990s,
when immigration offered a possibility for right-wing parties to mobilize the
diffuse anti-universalistic counter-potential against the libertarian left, which had
already emerged in the 1970s at the attitudinal level (Sacchi, 1998). In some
countries, this potential gave rise to the emergence of powerful parties of the
extreme right, while in others, it was absorbed by the established right.
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Thus, although the extreme populist right introduced a novel ‘ethno-pluralistic’ or
‘differentialist nativist’ discourse (Betz, 2004; Betz and Johnson, 2004), this second
cultural dimension of political conflict emerged both in countries where an exponent
of this new party family was present, as well as where parties of the established
right averted their entry with more restrictive positions on immigration (evidence
is provided by Kitschelt, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Warwick, 2002;
Bornschier, 2005; Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008). Consequently – and although it may
prove more or less durable depending on whether or not an extreme right-wing
populist party is present – a similar cultural dimension of conflict opposing liber-
tarian-universalistic convictions and traditionalist-communitarian values emerged
throughout Western Europe in the 1980s and the 1990s (Bornschier, 2010b). One
side holds universalistic conceptions of community and advocates individual
autonomy, while the other emphasizes the right to preserve traditional communities
in which common moral understandings have developed, and that are seen as
threatened by a multicultural society. Whether or not this division acquires the
long-term stability that most scholars conceive as a defining feature of cleavages
(Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Bartolini and Mair, 1990; To´ka, 1998; Rokkan, 1999)
remains to be seen.
In this analysis, I begin with the existence of a two-dimensional space. Although
there is some debate over whether one or two dimensions are necessary to
accurately map party positions,1 my aim is not to verify this finding here. Instead,
I build on previous studies and use the same data, based on a coding of the policy
statements of political parties in election campaigns, as two analyses that have
presented evidence for both an economic and a cultural dimension to structure
party positions in Germany and France (Bornschier, 2008; Dolezal, 2008a). Given
the similarity of the structure of political space, this feature cannot account for the
varying success of the extreme right in the two countries. Consequently, this
article goes beyond previous studies in analyzing how the patterns of opposition
within the same space created political potential for the Front National in France,
while similar parties have remained largely without success in Germany.
Existing explanations for the weakness of the extreme right in Germany
The absence of a right-wing populist party is striking in light of the similarity of
the basic dimensions underlying the party system in Germany and in countries
where these parties have been successful (Kriesi et al., 2006; Dolezal, 2008a). In
this section, I briefly discuss three of the most important explanations advanced
for the failure of the extreme right in Germany. The first points to institutional
factors, and in particular to the 5% threshold that parties must reach in order to
1 See van der Brug and van Spanje (2009), as well as the various contributions in a recent special issue
of West European Politics (Enyedi and Deegan-Krause, 2010). At the very least, looking at the economic
and the cultural dimensions separately is analytically fruitful, as the empirical analysis will show.
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gain representation in the federal parliament. According to Givens (2005), this
feature goes a long way in explaining the lack of success of the extreme right in
Germany. Upon closer inspection, several points place doubt on this explanation.
First, it is worth remembering that the first transformation of cultural conflicts in
Germany, which took place in the 1970s and 1980s, resulted in the emergence of a
strong Green party, despite the 5% threshold. Most importantly, electoral rules
cannot explain the extreme right’s failure to institutionalize itself in those German
states where it has succeeded in passing the threshold. On various occasions, an
extreme right party has succeeded in passing the 5% threshold for representation
in regional legislatures. In almost all cases, however, the extreme right has been
unable to consolidate its success (see Sto¨ss, 2005: 124–133). If the votes for these
parties were guided by strategic considerations, the parties’ potential voters
should not have deserted them once represented in Parliament, having received a
signal that their votes were unlikely to be wasted. Other institutional features,
such as the rules for the state funding of parties, do not seem to create unfavorable
conditions for the extreme right in Germany either (Norris, 2005: 95–102). More
generally, Carter (2005) shows that characteristics of the electoral system do not
have a significant effect if the ideological and organizational features of right-wing
extremist parties are taken into account.
A second explanation points to the features of the extreme right parties
themselves to account for their limited appeal. Given the experience of National
Socialism, extreme right parties will clearly have to moderate their discourse and
distance themselves from fascism even more explicitly than elsewhere to attract
more than a handful of extremists and protest voters in Germany (see Art, 2006).
Against this background, it is obvious that neither the National Democratic Party
of Germany (NPD) nor the German People’s Union (DVU) is likely to make large
electoral inroads. The Republican Party, however, is often regarded as repre-
senting the ‘new’ extreme right party type (Ignazi, 2002: 28; Golder, 2003; Cole,
2005), and clearly had better chances of success. Indeed, Scho¨nhuber, the party’s
leader, explicitly stated the desire to turn the Republican Party into a right-wing
populist party inspired by the French Front National (Ignazi, 2003: 71–72).
Yet, as I will seek to show, the joint efforts of the mainstream right and left
prevented the Republicans from becoming a modern right-wing populist party.
Despite Scho¨nhuber’s efforts, he failed to develop an elaborate ‘cultural differ-
entialist’ discourse (Backes and Mudde, 2000: 459; Mudde, 2000: 171–172).
Owing to the mainstream right’s capacity to co-opt the extreme right’s culturalist
discourse by politicizing the immigration issue and by orchestrating Germany’s
reunification, all but the most extreme part of the traditionalist-communitarian
terrain was occupied (Sto¨ss, 2005: 38–40, 86; Art, 2006: 158, 163). In addition,
because the Social Democrats denounced the extreme right’s anti-democratic
character, but refrained from taking a strong counter-position, the radicalization
of mainstream right voters was averted. As a consequence of the joint strategies of
the mainstream left and right therefore, even the Republicans lacked broad
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appeal. My account, which focuses precisely on the behavior of mainstream
parties, therefore nuances and modifies a third common explanation for the lack
of success of the German extreme right: it is not the Christian Democratic sister
parties’ ability to restrict the political space to their right that explains the
weakness of the German extreme right (e.g. Minkenberg, 1997: 155; Jaschke,
1999: 141–142; Niedermayer, 2006: 119; Dolezal, 2008a), but rather the inter-
play of the strategies of the mainstream left and right.
Historical cleavages and the mobilization space for new conflicts
One potential explanation is missing from the debate: from a cleavage perspective
(Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Kriesi and Duyvendak, 1995; Rokkan, 1999; Bartolini,
2000), established conflicts limit the space for the mobilization and political mani-
festation of new political groups. New divides will only materialize if the established
cleavage structure no longer ‘organizes’ issues that cut across existing lines of divi-
sion ‘out of politics’, to put it in Schattschneider’s (1975 [1960]: Ch. 4) words. Thus,
the highly uneven success of parties of the extreme populist right may be explained
by the varying strength of older state-market and religious cleavages.
In order to assess the impact of established cleavages in structuring alignments,
we must assess the degree to which cleavages really matter in party competition.
Put differently, we must incorporate the role of political agency in creating and
reproducing the group identifications that underlie historical cleavages. Based on
the insight that conflict has group-binding functions (Coser, 1956), I postulate
that the level of political conflict plays an important role for the long-term fate of
an institutionalized cleavage. Only if the group identifications underlying the
cleavage are maintained by ongoing conflicts over policy, will members of an
objective social category remain loyal to the parties that historically represented
their interests, as Sartori (1968) pointed out long ago. Cleavages remain stable to
the degree that the basic oppositions they represent continue to shape voters’
understandings and interpretations of everyday politics, thereby ‘organizing out’
new issues. New voters are socialized into the existing structure of cleavages
(Bartolini and Mair, 1990). In this process, they develop cognitive schemas that
allow them to interpret new issues in terms of more basic ideological divisions.
Acknowledging the role of political conflict helps make sense of the famous
‘freezing into place’ of European party systems that Lipset and Rokkan (1967)
observed. Thus, I hypothesize that where the state-market cleavage has remained
vibrant, the space for the mobilization of new cultural divisions is restrained.
Mainstream party positions and the electoral fortunes of the extreme
populist right
Political conflict around established cleavages impinges on the mobilization of
new conflicts, but so too does the manner in which established parties handle the
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new value conflicts the extreme populist right thrives on. In this section, I sys-
tematize the various explanations regarding the impact of mainstream party
positions on the emergence and electoral fortunes of the extreme populist right. I
derive three hypotheses from the extant literature, and then present two of my
own, which modify and partially contradict earlier assumptions.
First, the populist right presumably has difficulties in breaking into party sys-
tems in which established actors already absorb the traditionalist-communitarian
potential. Several authors have suggested that the convergence of mainstream
parties creates, while more divergent positions restrict, space for the extreme right
(see also the more extended discussion in Mudde, 2007: Ch. 10). Focusing on
overall left-right measures of political space, most studies measure the proximity
of mainstream parties (Abedi, 2002; Luebbers et al., 2002; Arzheimer, 2009),
while others focus solely on whether the centrist position of the established right
provides political space for a polarizing party (van der Brug et al., 2005), or test
both propositions (Carter, 2005). Although many studies tend to find some sup-
port for this proposition, the evidence is not conclusive. This is partially due to the
scarcity of adequate data to measure party positions. Although most of these
studies appear to suggest that the convergence thesis applies mainly to the cultural
domain, or even exclusively to the immigration issue, they often employ overall
left-right measures of political space.
Second, Kitschelt (2007), building on Kitschelt and McGann (1995), suggests a
variant of the convergence hypothesis: mainstream party proximity along the
economic dimension makes voters open to right-wing populist parties’ appeals
along the cultural dimension. This hypothesis corresponds to the cleavage argu-
ment put forward in the preceding section: to the degree that the state-market
cleavage has been pacified, political space is opened for the mobilization of
conflicts rooted in social groups different from the class conflict. Measuring
mainstream party positions separately along the economic and the cultural
dimensions, this article provides the first joint empirical test of both variants of
the convergence hypothesis.
Third, returning to the cultural divide, the opposite view to the first hypothesis,
namely, that mainstream party polarization may actually help the extreme right,
has also been voiced. Thus, Arzheimer and Carter (2006) argue that by issuing
tough stances with respect to immigration, the established right may legitimize the
extreme right’s claims and thereby foster its success. The apparent contradiction
between this and the former hypotheses may be because the strategy to prevent
the emergence of an extreme right party differs from the strategy best suited to
contain the success of such a party already present. This roughly corresponds to
the sequential hypothesis put forward by Ignazi (2003): it was the polarizing
strategy of the conservative mainstream parties in the early 1980s, and their
subsequent move back to the center, that opened space for the extreme right. In a
similar vein, Ellinas (2010) shows that mainstream parties may politicize national
identity issues, but are then often forced to moderate their positions because of
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internal divisions within the party or when they come to govern. Consequently,
established parties first legitimize the extreme right’s appeals, and then leave the
nationalist political space unoccupied by moving back to the center.
A fourth hypothesis modifies Ignazi’s account and specifies that it applies only
to the entry of an extreme right challenger: it is not party system polarization as
such, which much of the quantitative literature has focused on, but the position
of the mainstream left that is crucial. Many parties of the established right,
including the French Gaullists and the German Union parties, played with fire in
the early 1980s by politicizing the immigration issue. My explanation as to why
the German parties succeeded in averting the entry of an extreme right competitor,
whereas the French mainstream parties failed, focuses on the reaction of the
mainstream left. If the latter chooses an adversarial strategy against an extreme
populist right challenger by denouncing its anti-immigrant stance and by pro-
moting a universalistic defense of multiculturalism, this reinforces the extreme
right’s issue ownership of the traditionalist-communitarian position.
My account of the role of the mainstream left differs from Meguid’s (2005,
2008) in a crucial respect, which is consequential for the capacity of the main-
stream parties to avert the entry of an extreme right competitor: competition in
the cultural domain is not exclusively about immigration. Rather, as the prior
discussion concerning the transformation of the cultural dimension has made
clear, the New Left and the extreme populist right defend polar normative ideals
along a dimension that encompasses a range of cultural issues. To the degree that
the mainstream left adopts or retains a clear New Left profile in the light of the
extreme right challenge, the subsequent polarization of the cultural dimension due
to the joint efforts of the extreme right and the New Left results in the cultural
dimension becoming the prime dimension of opposition.2 In this situation, the
extreme populist right can claim to represent a traditionalist-communitarian
counter-position to the libertarian-universalistic conviction of the left much more
credibly than the established right, which often meshes restrictive positions regarding
immigration with rather tolerant attitudes with respect to cultural liberalism. It thus
falls short of approximating the extreme right’s ideology, which centers on an
extreme position in both domains. If, however, the established parties jointly succeed
in keeping polarization around the issues relating to immigration, multiculturalism,
and cultural liberalism low, this dimension will prove less divisive, and the entry of a
right-wing populist challenger will be unlikely.
Contrary to the latter, my fifth hypothesis focuses not on the entry, but on
the subsequent success of extreme right parties. Whether mainstream parties are
able to crowd out extreme right parties that are already established remains an
2 From this perspective, it also appears doubtful that the left’s decision to take a strong counter-
position to the extreme right should be driven primarily by strategic considerations. Since the extreme
right represents a counter-mobilization to the New Left, the latter will quite naturally defend its con-
victions, as I argue in the conclusion to this article.
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open question. Drawing on Ellinas’ (2010), and Kitschelt’s (2007) emphasis on
issue ownership, I argue that co-opting the extreme right’s message is difficult
once such a party has institutionalized: voters are likely to prefer the original,
rather than the copy, as Jean-Marie Le Pen, the Front National’s long-term leader,
has frequently stated. Thus, it becomes a daring, if not impossible, task for the
center-right to crowd out its extreme right challenger once it is firmly entrenched,
because the latter constitutes a much more credible counter-pole to the uni-
versalistic New Left than the former. As Ellinas’ (2010) and Meguid’s (2008)
detailed analyses show, and as the analysis presented in this article confirms, center-
right parties often send mixed signals to voters with anti-universalistic and exclu-
sionist worldviews. My analysis of the French case shows that, once an extreme
right party has established its position at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of
the cultural divide, the varying positions of the mainstream parties have little effect
on its electoral success.
To summarize, the empirical part of this article will test the following hypotheses.
First, that the saliency of the state-market cleavage hinders the mobilization of the
extreme right in Germany; second, that the position of the established right makes
the difference, either by legitimizing a position at the extreme of the traditionalist-
communitarian divide (hypothesis 2), or, inversely, by its capacity to crowd out its
extreme right competitor (hypothesis 3); fourth, that the viability of this strategy
depends on the mainstream left adopting a moderate position along the cultural
divide; and finally, that the position of the mainstream right is irrelevant to the
electoral success of the extreme right after the first rounds of party competition,
when the challenger has become firmly entrenched in the party system.
The extreme populist right in France and Germany: research design
To determine the positions of parties along the economic and the cultural divide, I
rely on data based on the media coverage of election campaigns, derived from a
coding of party positions as reported in newspapers during election campaigns
(see Kriesi et al., 2006; Dolezal, 2008b). In each country, all articles related to the
electoral contest or politics in general were selected from a quality newspaper and
a tabloid, covering the last 2 months before the election.3 The articles were coded
sentence-by-sentence using a method developed by Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings
(2001). The data predominantly captures statements that party exponents make
at press conferences and on other occasions, and the campaign data therefore
closely reflects what voters actually know of the parties’ positions. The data is
therefore more situational than expert surveys or party manifestos, which is
necessary to test the argument developed in this article: on the one hand, I assume
3 These newspapers analyzed are Le Monde and Le Parisien for France, and Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung and
Bild for Germany. For a detailed description of the coding procedure and data used for the present article,
see Dolezal (2008b).
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voters’ political identities are reinforced by conflict between parties, and this data has
the advantage of tapping parties’ policy positions regarding those disputes that
actually took place during election campaigns. On the other hand, the data offers
more accurate information on the positions of parties concerning the new cultural
divide, since the public debate has forced all parties to take positions regarding
immigration and traditionalist-communitarian values. The data covers three electoral
contests that took place between the late 1980s and the early 2000s, and one election
from the 1970s. Because of the lack of data for the 1980s, the data is supplemented
with information from secondary sources in order to assess how the mainstream
parties dealt with the cultural issue in this period of time.
The political issues put forward by parties in these campaigns are regrouped
into 12 broader categories that allow an operationalization of the political divides
relevant for this analysis. Thus, party positions along the economic dimension are
calculated as the mean of their stances with respect to support for the welfare state
and economic liberalism throughout the time period under consideration. These
two categories represent the poles of the state-market divide. Positions along the
cultural dimension, however, are determined differently in the 1970s and later
contests. In the 1970s, the cultural dimension was marked by cultural liberalism
and budgetary rigor in both countries, and additionally by support for the army in
Germany, as prior research has shown (Bornschier, 2010a: 180–183), and I cal-
culate parties’ positions as the weighted mean of these issue categories.4 The
antagonism between cultural liberalism and budgetary rigor, as well as support
for the army, can be interpreted as a neo-conservative anti-state position, which is
liberal in economic terms and traditionalist in cultural matters (see Habermas,
1985, Eatwell, 1989). From the late 1980s on, party positions along the cultural
dimension are expressed by their mean position with respect to cultural liberalism
and immigration policy. I take these two categories to embody the libertarian-
universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian line of conflict. Note that con-
ceiving of extreme right-wing populist parties as mobilizing along this dimension
differs from a view of these parties as single-issue anti-immigration movements
(e.g. see also Mudde, 1999; Meguid, 2008; Ellinas, 2010).
As an indicator of the degree of polarization a divide entails in a particular
election, the standard deviations of parties’ positions is used. This allows me to
test my first hypothesis, that is, whether differing intensities of conflict along the
state-market cleavage leave varying room for the culturalist mobilization of the
extreme populist right. Furthermore, measuring the standard deviation of party
positions along the cultural divide can verify the second hypothesis, that is, the
various propositions regarding the consequences of party system features for the
entry of extreme right parties.
4 The mean is weighted by the relative salience of the issue, which gives more important issues more
weight in determining the positions of parties. Tables A.4–A.7 in the online Appendix contain the issue-
positions of parties and the salience of the issues in the two countries.
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In a second step, I relate the positions of parties to those of their voters in order
to assess how accurately parties represent the preferences of voters. Party system
responsiveness is an essential feature of the analysis for two reasons. Concerning
the established state-market cleavage, a mismatch between political supply and
demand is likely to erode the link between parties and their social constituencies,
opening up space for new divisions based on other group attachments. Taking
responsiveness into account qualifies the above argument: if mainstream party
convergence along the economic cleavage adequately mirrors diminishing differ-
ences in preferences between electorates, then it is less likely to lead to realign-
ments along the cultural dimension than if parties fail to adequately represent
their voters. With respect to the new divide between libertarian-universalistic and
traditionalist-communitarian values, however, the responsiveness of the party
system determines whether the established parties are able to absorb the tradi-
tionalist-communitarian potential: if parties fail to adequately represent voters
along this new dimension, challenging parties will find fertile ground. Thus,
measuring party system responsiveness along the new cultural divide is necessary
in order to verify my claim that, despite the presence of an extreme right party in
one case and its absence in the other, parties in France and Germany have
remained responsive to their respective electorates.
To measure responsiveness, I determine voter positions along the dimensions
structuring party competition using survey data from national election studies.
Most of the issue categories forming the divides discussed above can be oper-
ationalized using national election studies, and I use principal component factor
analysis to combine the various survey items that correspond to the categories into
an index. The survey items used and their assignment to the categories employed
in the analysis of party positions are available in the online Appendix. Voters’
positions along the dimensions are then derived from a second factor analysis
combining the two relevant issue categories into an index. The mean positions of
parties and their voters cannot be compared directly, because they have been
measured on different scales. However, it is possible to assess the congruence of
representation by calculating the correlations between positions. Because this only
taps the covariance between positions, the differing scales are not a problem. Note
that while the economic and cultural divides are both value dimensions, they are
measured using statements for both parties and voters that tap positions with
respect to concrete political issues and conflicts.
The structure of economic and cultural oppositions in France and Germany
This section presents aggregated results concerning party system features in
Germany and France. Figures 1 and 2 map the degree of polarization of the two
countries’ party systems, as well as their responsiveness to voter preferences along
the economic and cultural divisions, respectively, for each election. I start with the
economic cleavage in order to test whether the German party system remains
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Figure 1 Polarization and party system responsiveness along the state-market cleavage in
France and Germany.
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Figure 2 Polarization and party system responsiveness along the cultural divide in France
and Germany.
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more polarized along this dimension than the French, thus opening more space for
the mobilization of cultural conflicts in the latter. While there are elections that
exhibit a somewhat lower match between the positions of parties and their voters,
Figure 1 does not reveal marked differences between the two countries due to
medium-to-low levels of polarization and rather responsive party systems in most
elections in both countries. Since the 1970s, the economic divide has thus not been
strongly reinforced by political conflict. Loyalties related to the state-market
cleavage may have delayed, but not organized out completely the rising promi-
nence of political identities related to the new cultural divide.
While the nature of oppositions is thus quite similar along the economic
dimension in the two countries, the nature of conflicts differs much more strongly
with respect to the cultural dimension, as Figure 2 reveals. In France, the party
system has clearly become more polarized along the new cultural line of conflict
than along the economic divide. With the manifestation of the left-libertarian
agenda in party competition in the 1970s, the party system first lost, but subse-
quently regained, responsiveness due to a reconfiguration of partisan alignments
and parties’ political offers. By the late 1980s, under the impact of the mobili-
zation of the populist right, a three-block structure emerged in which the poles are
constituted by the left-libertarian and the traditionalist-communitarian blocks,
with the center-right squeezed into the middle, as we shall see later. At the end of
this process of party system transformation, parties closely mirror the positions of
the electorate, that is, they are indeed responsive.
In Germany, however, the party system was relatively polarized in 1976 and
then again in 1998, but not in 1994 and 2002. And while the level of polarization
varies, the party system is responsive to voter preferences throughout the period
studied. How could the emergence of a political space defined by the same two
dimensions in France and in Germany have such different consequences with
respect to the configuration and polarization of the party system? The next section
shows that not only the mainstream right, but also the left pursued diverging
strategies in dealing with the new cultural issues that have shaped political con-
troversy since the 1970s.
Mainstream party positions and space for the populist right in France
France is a prime example that seems to corroborate Ignazi’s (2003) influential
claim that the established right pushed a radicalization of political discourse
which right-wing populist parties later thrived on. In 1977, the right-wing gov-
ernment, confronted with rising levels of unemployment, announced plans to
repatriate immigrants. However, the counter-mobilization of the unions and the
non-communist left, as well as by parts of the right, led the government to
abandon the plan (Martin, 2000: 258–259). In the 1978 parliamentary election,
immigration was no longer a prominent issue, and thus does not form part of the
cultural dimension. In a campaign centering on cultural liberalism and budgetary
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rigor, the mainstream parties, with only the partial exception of the Gaullist Rally
for the Republic (RPR), did not differ strongly with respect to their positions on
the cultural dimension. The party system was clearly unresponsive in this campaign,
as reflected in the low match between party positions and the preferences of their
electorates. Nonetheless, the Front National, which competed in those elections,
won a mere 0.3% of the vote.5 Hence, the mainstream right’s playing with the fire
was not enough to create space for the extreme right.
The dynamics of competition changed 3 years later after the 1981 elections,
won by the left. When the Socialist government under Mitterrand decided to
regularize illicit immigrants and abandon the death penalty, the right radicalized
its discourse to oppose these measures. The Socialists, having been forced to
abandon their ambitious plan of Keynesian demand stimulation, continued to
push polarization. In light of the early successes of the Front National, it promoted
anti-racism as a central issue, defending a multiculturalist ‘recognition of difference’
(Perrineau, 1997: 49–50). This position contributed to the rising salience of the
cultural as opposed to the economic dimension of conflict. Furthermore, it rein-
forced the Front National’s ownership of the immigration issue (Meguid 2005,
2008: 159–163). The mainstream right was uneasily caught in between: after
oscillating for some time between playing down the immigration issue and taking a
tough stance due to internal divisions (Meguid, 2008: 163–165), it seems to have
begun sending clearer signals taking the Front National’s policy position seriously
from the mid-1980s on (Ellinas, 2010: 181–184). Nonetheless, this strategy proved
unable to stop the extreme right’s entry into the system.
From the 1980s on, when the immigration issue had become a permanent
feature of party competition in France, the new cultural divide was established.
For each election shown in Figure 3, the first line indicates the positions of parties
and the second line that of their voters. A position to the left indicates a liber-
tarian-universalistic stance, while a position to the right denotes a traditionalist-
communitarian resistance against these universalistic principles. The bars beneath
the average positions of parties and voters show the standard deviation of party
statements and voter orientations, respectively. The result of the clear ideological
posture of the left in conjuncture with the rise of the Front National is mirrored in
the evolution of the patterns of opposition between 1978 and 1988. The results
presented in Figure 3 underline the polarizing strategy of the Socialists and
Communists, which have moved towards the libertarian-universalistic pole of the
divide. With the Front National catering for the opposing traditionalist-commu-
nitarian pole of the divide, polarization surges between 1978 and 1988. The
Gaullist RPR has not changed its position very much. Although the Gaullists took
5 The Front National’s position cannot be determined in 1978 due to an insufficient number of
statements in the media. The position of its voters, however, is very dispersed along the cultural
dimension, resulting in an average centrist position. It thus seems as if the party did not primarily
mobilize on this dimension at the beginning of its rise.
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restrictive positions with regard to immigration, they did not clearly oppose
cultural liberalism, as the more detailed position measures provided in Table A.4
in the online Appendix show. As a result, the RPR is situated at a considerable
distance from the Front National. This leaves ample room for the latter to
mobilize an electorate that is similarly extreme to the party itself. Although there
Match (5 parties): 0.29
Polarization parties: 0.21
Match (6 parties): 0.80
Polarization parties: 0.59 | Without FN: 0.06
Match (5 parties): 0.98
Polarization parties: 0.73 | Without FN: 0.54
Match (4 parties): 0.99
Polarization parties: 0.62 | Without FN: 0.44
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pcf psf udf rpr front
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psfgreens udf rpr front
pcf psfmrg rpr front
exl pcfpsfgreens rpr front
exlpcf psfmrggreens udf rpr front
pcf
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udf
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1978: parties (above) and voters (below)
1988: parties (above) and voters (below)
1995: parties (above) and voters (below)
2002: parties (above) and voters (below)
Figure 3 Parties and voters on the cultural divide in France, 1978–2002.
Notes: exl, extreme-left parties; front, Front National; greens, Greens, other ecologist parties;
mrg, Movement of Left-Wing Radicals; pcf, French Communist Party; psf, French Socialist
Party; rpr, Rally for the Republic (Gaullist; later, Union for a Presidential Majority, then
Union for a Popular Movement); udf, Union for French Democracy, small centrist parties.
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is some overlap between relatively traditionalist supporters of the RPR and the
less traditionalist followers of the Front National, a large number of the latter’s
voters are located at the extreme of the dimension. The relatively large spread of
the RPR’s issue statements also underlines the party’s difficulty in defining its
position on the cultural dimension, and its voters are also more dispersed along
the spectrum than those of the Front National.
While the 1995 campaign mirrors the situation of the preceding one, the
Gaullists’ shift in position in the most recent contest covered by the data under-
lines that the Front National’s electoral support has become largely independent
from the positions of the mainstream right. In 2002, the established right suddenly
converged with the left in a libertarian-universalistic position.6 In light of this
quite dramatic change of strategy on the part of the mainstream right, the growth
of Le Pen’s support base from 15% in 1995 to 16.9% in the first round of the
2002 presidential elections appears rather meager. Indeed, Le Pen made it to the
run-off in that election, yet the story of the Front National up until 2002 is one of
a more or less linear rise in success.7
No space for the populist right in Germany?
How did the strategies of the established parties in Germany differ from those of
their counterparts in France? Since World War II, the two Christian Democrat sister
parties have proven a remarkable capacity for integrating the entire right-wing
spectrum. Smith (1976), discussing Germany’s ‘restricted ideological space’, points
out that ‘The early ability of the CDU to spread itself across the previously rigid lines
of German society led to the assimilation of a large proportion of the electorate
within a single umbrella-party’ (1976: 402). In the 1970s, Germany witnessed a
‘renaissance of conservatism’ as a reaction to the 1968 student movement and the
formation of a social-liberal government after the 1972 election. Confronted with
the decline of religiosity, the Union parties seized the opportunity and endorsed the
Zeitgeist by stressing the importance of the family for moral guidance, and by
propagating a new historical and national consciousness (Grande, 1988). As Figure 4
shows, the positions of the major parties and their voters were much more
polarized in the German elections of 1976 than was the case in the late 1970s in
France. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) and Free Democratic Party (FDP), their
Liberal coalition partner, strongly endorsed the universalistic norms of the New
Social Movements, and the SPD thus has a clear New Left profile. The position
of the Christian Democrat sister parties (CDU and CSU), however, reflects their
6 Both the Gaullists and the Socialists combined their libertarian-universalistic posture with strong
law and order stances in the 2002 campaign. Note that law and order stances are not included in the
construction of the cultural dimension since they are widely shared and therefore do not set French parties
apart (see Table A.4 in the online Appendix).
7 The figures referring to election results are from www.assemblee-nationale.fr, the website of the
French parliament.
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neo-conservative profile. The party system represents voter preferences almost
perfectly, and a two-block structure is clearly discernible at both levels.
The new conservative-liberal coalition that took office under Kohl’s chancellorship
in 1982 failed to bring the promised ‘turn’ in terms of concrete policies, however. This
was one of the major reasons that provoked the breakaway of the extreme right
Republikaner from their Bavarian Christian Democrat mother party (Grande, 1988;
spd fdp cdu csu
spdfdp cdu csu
Match (4 parties): 0.96
Polarization parties: 0.62
pdsgreens spd fdp cdu
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Polarization parties: 0.25
1976: parties (above) and voters (below)
1994: parties (above) and voters (below)
1998: parties (above) and voters (below)
2002: parties (above) and voters (below)
Figure 4 Parties and voters on the cultural divide in Germany, 1976–2002.
Notes: cdu, Christian Democratic Union; csu, Christian Social Union (only in Bavaria); fdp,
Free Democratic Party, liberals; exr, extreme right parties (including the National Democratic
Party, German People’s Union, and Republican Party); pds, Party of Democratic Socialism;
spd, Social Democratic Party.
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Minkenberg, 1992: 70–72; Ignazi, 2003: 74–75). The odds for absorbing the tradi-
tionalist political potential improved, however, with the rise of two new issues on the
political agenda. For one thing, the Union orchestrated the reunification of the country
under Helmut Kohl’s leadership and thereby deprived the extreme right of one of its
central themes of the post-war decades (Sto¨ss, 2005: 38–40, 86). For another, the CSU
and parts of the CDU had already taken up the immigration issue in the early 1980s.
A few weeks before the fall of the social-liberal coalition, CDU leader Helmut Kohl
demanded the reduction of the number of foreigners in Germany, and the CSU
continued to campaign against refugees (Thra¨nhardt, 1995; Schmidtke, 2004).
Obviously, then, the established right pursued a similar strategy to that of its
counterpart in France in the early 1980s. Consequently, the hypothesis focusing on
the availability of political space for the extreme right cannot explain why the Front
National was successful in France, while the Republicans failed in Germany. The
crucial difference, then, lies in the reaction of the left. Using Meguid’s (2005) terms,
the Socialists in France pursued an ‘adversarial strategy’ regarding traditionalist-
communitarian issues, making multiculturalism a central claim, while the SPD
employed a ‘dismissive strategy’ by systematically downplaying the immigration
question. In retrospect, Helmut Schmidt explained that the SPD in 1980 had decided
not to ask for local voting rights for foreigners, which were discussed at the time,
because this went ‘against the instincts of our core electorate’, namely, their blue-
collar constituency (Thra¨nhardt, 1995: 327; Schmidtke, 2004: 166–167). However,
the Union parties reacted promptly when they were confronted with a wave of
extreme right activism and violence in the early 1990s. They succeeded not only in
modifying the constitution to allow for a far more restrictive immigration policy, but
also in forcing the SPD into the so-called ‘asylum compromise’ (Schmidtke, 2004:
169). Hence, the SPD again avoided a stretching of the ideological space. Rather than
legitimizing the immigration issue, the combined strategies of the major parties of the
left and right ousted the issue from the political agenda. A similar scenario occurred
in 1999, when the red–green coalition announced a reform of Germany’s nationality
law. The Union parties launched a large debate on national identity, demanding
that immigrants must conform to Germany’s ‘guiding culture’ (‘Leitkultur’). As a
consequence, the new nationality law was drafted in close collaboration with the
opposition, because the government wanted to keep the issue out of partisan politics.
In line with this narrative, the positions of parties and voters presented in Figure 4
show a clear break between the situation in the mid-1970s and the three more
recent contests, where the old contrast is no longer present. The most striking
feature of the new pattern is that the two major parties, the SPD and the CDU, do
not take strongly opposing positions, and that the same holds true for their
respective average voters. In the 1994 contest, a year after the new immigra-
tion law took effect, the SPD and CDU lie very close to one another, a finding
confirmed in the later elections. Together, the major parties lie closer to the
libertarian-universalistic pole in 1994, move to the center of the spectrum in
1998, and then move back to the left in 2002.
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In 1994, we cannot place the smaller actors due to the media’s narrow focus on
the three traditional German parties, but the results for 1998 indicate that they
occupy the universalistic space to the left of the SPD, which the latter has abandoned
since the mid-1970s. While large parts of the electorate are thus bound into an
alliance with the two major centrist parties, the Greens mobilize the forefront of the
New Left electorate.8 In turn, by leaving the libertarian-universalistic electorate to
the Greens, the SPD has avoided a dealignment in the party system that could have
provided a new constituency for the extreme right. Although the party system is
responsive to voter preferences, then, the absence of a counter-pole to the Greens
mobilizing voters at the traditionalist-communitarian extreme of the preference
distribution implies an imbalance in the party system. A potential for differentiation
exists on the right, since the center of the axis halves the distribution of respondents.
In other words, many voters lie to the right of the average CDU/CSU voter. How-
ever, apart from the small group of extreme right followers, these voters do not seem
inclined to support new or anti-establishment political parties.
In the two more recent elections, Republikaner, NPD, and DVU voters are sub-
sumed under the extreme right label. This electorate is clearly situated at the extreme
of the cultural dimension, but lacking a ‘modern’ right-wing populist discourse, and
with the immigration issue off the agenda, the corresponding parties are unable to
mobilize voters beyond their core constituency of hardline authoritarians. To a large
degree, then, voters with traditionalist-communitarian worldviews vote for the
Union parties. However, the Union parties do not permanently mobilize this
potential. Rather, it remains latent most of the time and does not manifest itself
politically. This is only possible because of the collusive strategy the major parties of
the left and right generally pursue, combined with the Union’s temporarily moving
to the right whenever the immigration issue actually surfaces in the public debate.
Conclusion
Table 1 summarizes the implications of the analysis for the various hypotheses
concerning the impact of mainstream party positions on the ability of an extreme
populist right party to gain entry to the party system and subsequently consolidate
its success. Similarly to France, it is not the strength of the state-market cleavage
that precludes a stronger mobilization of cultural conflicts in Germany (hypothesis 1).
Hence, while the convergence of the mainstream parties may be a necessary con-
dition for the emergence of an extreme right party, it is by no means a sufficient one.
In both countries, the libertarian-authoritarian antagonism characteristic of the
1970s was transformed by the advent of the issue of community on the political
agenda in the 1980s and 1990s. As I have shown in this article, the nature of the
resulting conflict differs in the two countries. Despite both party systems remaining
8 To a more limited degree, the same holds true for the post-socialist PDS, but in the elections under
study here, this remains a phenomenon confined to Eastern Germany.
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largely responsive to voters, oppositions have been polarized between parties in
France since the 1980s, when the Front National established itself as a durable
actor in French politics. Once established, an extreme right party contributes to
perpetuating this polarized pattern of opposition, since it keeps disputes over the
proper definition of binding norms, and over what constitutes the basis of the
national community, on the political agenda. Despite the recent electoral losses of
the Front National, there is little evidence that the mainstream parties are able to
strategically crowd out an extreme right competitor that is already established, or
to oust its key issues from the political agenda (hypothesis 5).
Table 1. Hypotheses and empirical evidence of the analysis
Hypotheses Empirical results
1. Strength of state-market cleavage limits space
for cultural conflicts (related hypothesis:
convergence of mainstream parties along
economic dimension creates space for extreme
populist right)
Pacification of economic conflicts is not a sufficient
condition for emergence of the extreme populist
right: economic dimension less polarized than
cultural dimension in both France and Germany;
in both cases, centripetal competition in party
systems that are responsive to electorates
2. Polarization of mainstream right along the
cultural dimension legitimizes extreme right
discourse and favors entry of extreme populist
right as center-right parties move back to center
Disconfirmed: polarizing strategy of mainstream
right parties and subsequent move back to the
center in both Germany and France, but extreme
right not successful in Germany; Front National
does not profit from the Gaullists’ move to the
center in the 1978 election
3. Centrist strategy of mainstream right along
cultural dimension creates space and favors the
entry of an extreme right challenger
Only partially correct: entry of extreme right party
is inhibited by the German center-right’s move
to the right whenever threatened. Most of the
time, however, the mainstream right occupies a
centrist position along the cultural dimension,
containing its salience
4. Ability of mainstream right to crowd out
extreme right competitor depends on the
behavior of the left: polarizing strategy of
the New Left favors entry and entrenchment
of extreme right
Confirmed: centrist position of the mainstream left
along cultural dimension in Germany represents
the crucial difference to party behavior in France,
where the socialists adopted a strongly
libertarian-universalistic profile
Further evidence in support of the hypothesis
comes from Switzerland and the Netherlands,
which conform to the French and German cases,
respectively. The Austrian trajectory suggests that
the behavior of the mainstream left is less relevant
where the extreme right results from a
transformation of an established party
5. No effect of mainstream right position on the
success of extreme populist right party once
established: polarizing strategy only impedes
entry, but not subsequent success of extreme
populist right party once entrenched
Confirmed: minimal effect of Gaullists’ shifting
positions on success of Front National in France
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Mainstream party behavior in the early stages of the extreme right challenge is
therefore crucial. Contrary to what is suggested by other studies taking a snapshot
of party positions at one point in time, the German Christian Democrats do not
permanently close the space to their right (hypothesis 3). Rather, oppositions
along the cultural divide in Germany have oscillated between more or less
polarized patterns since the 1970s. The result is that issues relating to immigration
and multiculturalism are not permanently on the political agenda, thereby con-
taining the realigning potential of a polarization of cultural conflicts. However, by
moving to the right, the Christian Democratic Union parties have the continuing
ability to rally voters holding traditionalist-communitarian preferences whenever
they are challenged by an extreme right competitor.
Hence, the simple polarization hypothesis, which states that the mainstream
right’s politicization of identity issues legitimizes the extreme right’s discourse,
cannot explain the difference between Germany and France (hypothesis 2). My
modified account, however, does: contrary to earlier studies, the analysis reveals that
the most important factor impinging on the fortune of the populist right in Germany
lies in the interplay of the strategies of the mainstream left and right (hypothesis 4).
Were it not for the moderate position of the Social Democrats, the centripetal
competition in the cultural domain could not be maintained. Instead, collusion
among the major parties prevents cultural or value oppositions from becoming
salient and divisive. While this strategy has resulted in the emergence of one of the
most successful Green parties in Europe, it has also precluded more far-reaching
realignments along the cultural dimension comparable to those in France.
The question remains how consciously this joint strategy of the German main-
stream left and right was chosen, and whether the account developed in this article
can be generalized to other contexts. Indeed, there is evidence showing that the
behavior of German parties was motivated by the memory of the Nazi regime and
by the common conviction that the establishment of an extreme right party should
be averted (Art, 2006). Nonetheless, the argument is not specific to Germany, in the
sense that similar strategies pursued elsewhere are likely to inhibit the entry of a
right-wing populist competitor as well. Since the German Social Democrats
exhibited a clear-cut New Left profile in the 1970s, they have clearly undergone a
programmatic shift that is difficult to account for if not by strategic reasons. Hence,
I find it more plausible to assume that strategy matters in the German case, but not
in the French case. Concerning France, Meguid (2005, 2008) suggests that the
Socialists adopted an adversarial strategy with respect to the Front National not so
much because of their ideological convictions, but primarily in order to weaken
their mainstream right competitor. However, if we conceive of the immigration
issue as part of a cultural dimension that is also central for the left, then what needs
explaining is why, in a case like Germany, a left-libertarian party did not take a
strong counter-position to the extreme populist right.
Obviously, the Christian Democrats’ maneuvering also requires explanation,
since the mainstream right may be tempted to continue invoking strongly
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traditionalist-communitarian messages. The Christian Democrats in Germany
have resisted this temptation, in part perhaps because of the memory of National
Socialism, but also due to their hegemony within the right, which gives them
considerable leeway to shift their positions. In the latter respect, the situation has
been rather different in party systems characterized by competition within the
established right. This applies to Switzerland and Austria. Both the Swiss People’s
Party and the Austrian Freedom Party underwent a permanent transformation
to extreme right-wing populist parties in their attempt to attract voters with
traditionalist-communitarian worldviews from their center-right competitors.
In line with Ellinas’ (2010) argument, I have claimed that the behavior of the
mainstream parties is crucial above all with respect to the initial breakthrough of
extreme right parties. This has important implications for theories intended to
explain the varying fortunes of the extreme right. It implies that we cannot expect
the same factors to affect both the success of new parties of the extreme right, and
those that have resulted from the transformation of a mainstream party, as in
the case of the Swiss People’s Party or the Austrian Freedom Party. Given the
latters’ easier access to the media (see Ellinas, 2010; Bornschier, 2010a: 174–175),
they might be able to establish themselves as the owners of the traditionalist-
communitarian pole in the political space even in the absence of a mainstream left
bolstering their support by taking a decisive counter-position. What is more, these
parties already occupied a similarly extreme position along the then salient
libertarian-authoritarian divide in the 1970s (Bornschier, 2010b: 428). While the
Swiss Social Democrats’ behavior corresponds to that of their French counter-
part,9 the early entrenchment of the Austrian Freedom Party might be the reason
why this party began to flourish long before the Social Democrats started taking
a strongly antagonistic position against it (Art, 2006: 132–139).
In the Netherlands, however, the mainstream left and right seem to have
behaved in a manner roughly similar to Germany (see Kriesi and Frey, 2008 for an
analysis of the Dutch political space), although the liberal-conservative People’s
Party for Freedom and Democracy adopted a harsh position with respect to the
immigration issue throughout the 1990s. As a consequence, the issue remained on
the political agenda, presumably aiding Pim Fortuyn’s success in 2002. Yet, the
movement of all parties away from the libertarian-universalistic pole (see, e.g.
Bornschier, 2010a: 44) resulted in the Pim Fortuyn movement’s inability to con-
solidate its early success.
More broadly, then, this article shows that political actors may not be able to
inhibit structural conflicts frommanifesting themselves politically.How they manifest
themselves, however, is largely the result of politics. Thus, mainstream party behavior
impinges on how polarizing these conflicts become, and whether they provide an
opportunity for extremist parties to durably entrench themselves in party systems.
9 For data on party positions in Switzerland, from which this assessment is derived, see, for example,
Kriesi et al. (2006) and Lachat (2008).
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